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THE INTEGRATION OF AFRICA INTO THE WORLD CAPITALIST SYSTEM: 
1800-1945
By Reginald Herbold Green
The conquest of the earth, which mostly means taking it away 
from those who have a different complexion or slightly 
fatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you 
look at it too much. What redeems it is the idea only ... 
and an unselfish belief in the idea ~ something you can set 
up, and bow down before and o'ffer a sacrifice to ...
- Joseph Conrad, Heart of 
Darkness (1902)
The black man certainly has to pay dear for carrying the 
white man’s burden.
- George Padmore (1936)
The first raising of the metropolitan flags in the name 
of civilisation and their last lowering in the name of 
freedom were both attempts to make respec’cs.d_l© "uh.e simpj.i 
plan, That they should take who have the power. And they 
should keep who can”.
- Douglas Brown, Sunday 
Te 1 egraph (19 7 5")
We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited 
a great deal., we have been disregarded a great deal. It is 
our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited 
and disregarded.
- Arusha Declaration (1 9 6 7 )
Three apparently methodological problems arise in treating 
the colonial integration of Africa into the world capitalist system 
These relate to coverage, timing and stance. In fact they are mere 
than methodological because the choices made do carry implications 
as to what degrees of uniformity and homogeneity exist in substarw : 
and importance (as well as appearance and artifactuality).
Over the period 1800-19*15 a strong case exists for including 
Mediterranean Africa as well as sub-Saharan.1 In this period the 
previous unities and interactions of the Mediterranean region were
ruptured and the colonial patterns introduced bear more than a 
superficial resemblance on the two sides of the Sahara. It is 
perfectly true that colonial political economy required breaking 
the earlier long distance trade links between North and. West Africa 
and between East Africa and the rest of the Indian Ocean region 
and the supercession of Egyptian and Zanzibari colonialism with 
European. However, it had the same pattern of destruction and 
supplantation within sub-Saharan Africa at the long distance 
intersociety, intercontinental, and even "short distance" levels
e.g. in Sahel/Savannah-Coast trade in West Africa and interregional 
trade in East Africa; in the suppression of the Senegalese,
Ghanaian and Malagasy merchants' import export trade with Europe; 
in the implantation of new retail networks both of European firms 
like Unilever and CFAO and of new intermediate strata like the 
Lebanese community in West Africa and the Indian in East. Further, 
where the same colonial power ruled territories in both North and 
Subsaharan Africa (or on different shores of the Indian Ocean) new 
trade patterns among these units (e.g. Mahgreb-AOF, AEF and India- 
East Africa) were not inconsiderable. From a political economic 
perspective, tnerefore, a continental frame seems at least as 
appropriate as a Subsaharan one.
The problem of timing is one common to all models using
analytical "stages" or categories and then applied to different
2social and territorial units to examine the same time period.
First, the evolution of capitalism in the different colonial powers 
was not uniform in time; therefore their demands on African 
territories varied at any point in time. Further, because their 
domestic sub-class and production structures varied even over time 
no 1:1 homogeneity of uses for colonies could emerge: e.g. Belgium 
was never a major consumer goods exporter and this fact, reinforced 
by the Congo Basin Treaty uniform tariff and market access 
provisions,^ led to rather earlier attention to industrial production 
there than in other non-settler colonies. Second, at a second level 
the precise nature of the colonial relationship (and especially the 
number of expatriates) affected what type of production in colonies 
was perceived as producing a surplus for particular capitalists and 
the metropolitan power. Third, the objective conditions - both 
social and physical - of African territories influenced the timing, 
nature and degree of their incorporation.
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The problem of stance is a very real one. To centre on 
and from** the micro-level of an African society certainly puts 
Africans at the centre but tends to lose an African and, much 
more, a world perspective. To centre on and from a continental 
level has a danger of superficiality (or lack of portability) 
and of treating Africa as either separate from or merely an 
object of global dynamics. To centre on global models of history 
tends to lose Africans and reduce Africa to a minor case study both 
because since the decline of the Islamic dominance of the
Mediterranean region global power centres have not been located in 
Africa and because - with the exception of the period of the 
slave trade - Africa has been far from being the most important 
geographic region of the political economic periphery.
These problems are compounded by the racist element in the 
colonial heritage. The denigration of Africa in most pre-1960 
historical writing available in the metropolis’ or in Africa has 
led to a necessary countermovement to prove Africa, African 
societies and Africans were not inferior nor radically different 
from other continents, societies and people. On the one hand 
this can lead to rather over enthusiastic evaluations of a type 
largely defunct in serious historiography elsewhere and to mis­
reading warped and basically dependent African states (e.g. the 
Abcmey Kingdom) as a flowering of African genuis and on the other 
to taking Africa quite out of world contexts except in the mechanica 
sense of a victim to unexplained or facilely explained predatory 
forces. The historic fact that capitalism (at least industrial 
capitalism) first emerged in and has subsequently been centred on 
certain European and European settlement societies plus Japan" is 
as relevant to ^he actual course of African history as the q qu a j. y 
valid historic fact that African societies and polities not only 
could but did undergo transformation and change prior to and during 
the period of massive external intervention.
The difficulty lies in striking a balance and can be resolved 
only in the context of a specific piece of analysis.^* The title cf 
this paper requires that a global model of capitalist metropolitan 
expansion to the peripheral non-capitalist (or dependent capitalist’ 
societies serve as an underlying framework and that the main body 
of material relates to metropolitan colonial (industrial) capitalist 
penetration of Africa in terms of its effect on Africa and Africans.
'Portability and time both prevent detailed analysis of differences 
among African societies and sub-regions.
II
By 1800 external penetration of Africa - basically European
7capitalist or European capitalist dominated at one remove' - had 
already created a combination of dependence, disintegration and/or 
instability. It Is true that because the mercantilist relationships 
had not required large territorial bases (nor their African 
articulation been seen as justifying conquest on the scale of the 
"East Indian" chartered companies) the African physical presence 
was scattered, tiny and apparently fragile. That situation indeed 
was to pertain except in parts of the Mahgreb and Southern Africag
until nearly the end of the 19th century. However, the nature of 
the penetration was much more pervasive and much stronger than it 
appeared - a situation which in some of its variants is perhaps 
usefully emphasised by the evocative term pre-colonial neo­
colonialism.
The penetration had several aspects:
a. the slave trade had shattered some African societies, 
strengthened and warped others and generally reduced the 
level of productive forces;
b. the aftermath of the decline (or post-1800 abolition) of the 
slave trade had further altered African political and society 
power and production patterns;
c. the sale of arms had significantly improved the relative
position of the purchasers (whether in their own society or
vis a vis others);
d. the coastal nature of European direct contact had in some 
cases disintegrated coastal states (e.g. Kongo) and in others 
been used by them to resist growing interior based states 
(e.g. Farti-Ashanti conflict on Gold Coast);
e. imports from Europe had both debilitated craft industries on 
a local and an intraregional basis and weakened traditional 
long distance links creating a degree of dependence on European 
trade for the purchasers and seriously weakening groups 
producing partly for,or involved in;the supplanted trade (e.g. 
some Savannah societies in West Africa);
f. European knowledge and technology had come to be seen as
superior at least in many lines and there was a growing
demand for imported education, artifacts and production 
methods as well as arms. However, the imports tended to 
be artifactual and partial, increasing dependence rather 
than in a form readily incorporatable into the African 
societies ;
g. European direct long distance trade with the Far East and 
the shift of the main global gold source to the Western 
Hemisphere had similarly weakened the Mediterranean states 
and partially reversed their evolution in either productive 
capacity or state structure terms.
By 1800 two eras in which Africa had been of more central 
concern to the European economy lay in the past. Before 1500 Africa 
(via North Africa) had been the source of the bulk of Europe’s 
gold - a pattern relevant to the emergence of Italian mercantile 
and financial capitalism. Even after the opening of New World 
sources, West Africa had been a significant secondary source for 
a time but in 1800 that period was past and the South African 
gold production centre was not yet established. After 1500 the 
slave trade had been critical to European mercantile capitalist 
expansion and to the accumulation of capital for the industrial 
and financial capitalist base. Especially in the Caribbean and 
Brazilian plantations and some Latin American mines/ production 
depended on labour imports because the local population either 
could flee the affected areas or died under the work regime. The 
triangular trade was one critical to Europe with West Africa and 
the Caribbean very critical parts both of the periphery and of the 
centre’s dynamic of growth. By 1800 the slave trade was very 
far from abolished (indeed the East African variant centring on 
the Arab ruled Zanzibar state and that practiced by Mohammed Ali’s 
Egyptian state against the Sudanic societies had not yet begun) 
but it was no longer of central importance to European capitalism.
From the point of view of most elements in European capitalism 
Africa had become a relatively minor part of the periphery. Indeed 
on balance the first half of the 1 9th century was a period in which 
European capitalist relations with the periphery were to centre on 
existing settler colonies and ex-colonies and, to a lesser degree, on 
Caribbean-Indian-East Indian plantation/mercantile colonies, rather 
than on large scale opening up or acquisition of direct control over 
new areas in Africa or Asia. It would, however, be a mistake in 
1800 or at any other point to treat world capitalist or even
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national capitalist interests in and attitudes toward Africa 
as homogenous. At the lowest level the "legitimate trade” houses 
opposed the slave trade because it both damaged the labour 
power and social organisation capacity for producing (e.g.) palm 
oil and offered "unfair competition" by being more profitable to 
African intermediary states or merchants. More generally 
capitalists directly involved in long distance trade with Africa 
or with some particular market or supply connection there took a
*v
very different view of the costs of pre-colonial neo-colonial 
support or colonial unit creation and maintenance than did others. 
Until the latter quarter of the century the "African lobby" was 
rarely composed of the dominant capitalist interests and what 
state support it secured was both limited and probably more a 
transfer payment to consolidate capitalist class solidarity than 
a reflection of a real perceived interest in Africa by the 
dominant capitalist groups.
Under these circumstances; many African societies and states 
still retained a significant degree of autonomy and freedom to 
manoeuvre in 1800. The high point of the Ashanti state's advance 
toward hegemony over the Gold Coast and Savannah zone areas 
adjoining its forest base came in the 19th century as did the 
attempted transformation of Egypt into an autonomous capitalist 
economy with its own colonies under Mohammed Ali and the creation 
of the Kwazulu empire in Southern Africa. Even the more penetrated 
and dependent states often adapted to "intermediary" roles rather 
than collapsing or becoming abjectly dependent - the Fanti Con­
federacy and its member states' attempts to play off the European 
powers and the Ashanti, the Merina monarchy's long sustained 
attempt to use "modernisation" and an "open door" policy to keep 
French colonialism at bay, and the new "Oil Rivers" trading states 
of the Niger Delta are examples. It is true that in retrospect the 
first group of states and state building attempts were foredoomed 
because they came too late to halt the globalisation of a Eurocentr: 
capitalist system and too early to be fitted into it as inter­
mediaries and that the latter group of adaptations had set cut upon 
a course of change in which the options open to them became steadil; 
narrower but this was not evident to either the African takers or 
European decision takers at the time.
* <%»
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If one accepts that mercantile capitalism had dominated 
a growing share of Africa's long distance trade by 1800 and 
continued to increase its share and absolute volume over 
1800-1850 and at the same time takes note of the fact that 
the direct integration of Latin America into the industrial 
capitalist world system came largely subsequent to its 
political independence three questions arise:
a. Why was there a shift in the form of European penetration 
from dependency and its neo-colonialist variant to 
colonialism and its settler variant?
b. Why was this shift concentrated in the period 1850-1910?
c. Which metropolitan capitalist sub-classes (or formations) 
benefitted from the shift to colonial rule? To what 
extent were their gains met from increased exploitation 
of Africans (absolute or relative) and to what extent
by internal "transfer payments" within the metropolitan 
economies ?
d. What were the main results of the shift for Africans of 
different social strata, classes and formations?
Three reasons for the transition to colonial rule appear 
to have been d o m i n a n t :
a.) the imperialism of free trade (i.e. the freedom of 
stronger economic powers and units to enter freely 
into the territories and societies of weaker) was 
compatible with neo-colonial trade patterns and with 
the metropolitan interests of the leading capitalist
Qeconomies (primarily the UK in the relevant period ). 
However, the imperialism of exclusive neo-mercantilism 
was more appropriate to the interests of the capitalists 
of the less advanced capitalist economies (basically 
France in this context) and could not be so readily 
pursued via client states because these would tend to 
be penetrated by the leading capitalist s t a t e ’s traders 
who could establish new contact points to leapfrog 
existing trading posts and forts. Free trade could be
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imposed on really weak colonial powers e.g. Belgium 
and, to a degree, Portugal but not against a stronger 
one (Britain, France or Germany). therefore, the 
weaker capitalist metropots were under some pressure 
to secure exclusive colonies to maintain or expand 
their dependent trade links and short of a European 
war over African trade the only countermove for 
Britain was a combination of colonial acquisition 
fanning out from its client states and societies 
plus enforcement of access to Belgian and Portuguese 
c olonies;
b.) the client states and their (once removed client) 
neighbours had been very severely dislocated by the 
slave trade and its ending. They were, therefore, 
in many cases not seen as able to maintain patterns 
of stability and order conducive to penetration by 
trade. Attempts to make them more ’'helpful" sometimes 
led to breakdowns and some times to .LnvojLvement m  ui Ltm 
ill understood1 *^ ) intra-African conflicts (e.g. in Uganda 
the Sudan, the Gold Coast). Thus the first neo-colonial 
system came to be seen as incapable of much expansion 
and subject to irritating uncertainties beyond the cure 
of punitive raids;
c.) in the case of areas seen as suitable for larger scale 
European settlement or requiring large investments 
(e.g. mining operations) direct metropolitan rule was 
perceived as essential (with the temporary exceptions 
of the Afrikaaner Republics and Mohammed A l i 's E g y p t ) 
both because settlers would simply not accept African 
rule/nor investment markets loans to ventures situated 
in such doubtfully stable or predictable politics;
and because the social and political transformations 
necessary for most African client states to have played 
intermediary and compradore roles to these types of 
penetration were beyond their capacity over 1850-1900 
(as exemplified by the Merina Kingdom and the Egyptian 
state which sought to do so).
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This pattern was not unique to Africa. It was 
paralleled in Southeast Asia and, probably, in the US 
acquisition of the Spanish colonial empire (both in the 
1850-1910 period).
Given this set of reasons why the increasing rapidity 
of colonization from 1850 to its "comple tion" in 1910?
It is possible to explain this pattern in terms of the 
reasons given for the colonial shift i t s e l f :
a. French reassertion - both political and economic - 
from the 1 8 5 0 's onward was directed to Africa (as 
well as the Middle East and Indochina) and forced 
a delayed response by the United Kingdom (and in a 
different way Portugal) if it was not to be shut 
o u t ;
b. the gradual decline/abolition of the slave trade 
placed severe strains on some dependent states as 
did rather needlessly clumsy chartered company 
and smaller merchant or trading fort commander 
adventures leading either to polity breakdowns or 
hostilities leading to intervention followed by 
colonization;
c. the success of settler colonies in the North and 
South and the identification of mineral deposits 
and/or the markets and technology to make them 
relevant to European capitalism created a more 
general capitalist interest in colonial (as opposed 
to simply mercantile neo-colonial) penetration.
This is not an ’’empire acquired by inadvertence” model 
Had the colonies been clearly unsuited to the needs of 
European capitalism or uniformly dubious investments the 
pattern might have begun but would have been halted or 
reversed. Prior to 1875 many military interventions did 
seek to chasten an African polity and make it a useable 
dependent trading partner (e.g. the Vv’olsey dash to Kumasi,
the expedition against the Emperor Teodoras in Ethiopia).
It is to say that the rise of industrial capitalism created 
a situation in which penetration was more consistent with 
ruling group - and especially some sub-elements within 
some ruling group - interests, certain cases in which pre- 
colonial neo-colonialism was inadequate to exploit these 
interests, and an unstable situation in other cases such 
that an initial shift from neo-colonial to colonial by one 
metropolitan state would set off cumulative responses.
Broader elements of capitalist evolution in Europe 
and its geo-political elements are also relevant. B r i t a i n ’s 
main interest in respect of Egypt was securing firm control 
of the Su>ez Canal; German and Italian colonies were pawns 
in national ruling group geo-political and global economic 
strategies; France’s colonial empire was "sold” on the basis 
of reasserting a world leadership position as much as of 
economics (especially since near wars with Lhe UK and Germany 
on the periphery were easier to reign in before a major clash 
ensued than any European expansionist policy would have b e e n ) ; 
Portugal's colonies were seen as the symbol of its nationhood, 
its raison d'etre for not being a Spanish province /  " However, 
these aspects, while almost always of some and an occasion of 
central significance to the metropolitan political decision 
takers , were probably fairly secondary in their impact on what 
hap>pened during or after the actual conquest of colonies on 
the ground in Africa.
In examining gains and costs to capitalist subclasses 
it is necessary to specify the assumed alternative. Neither 
a "vanishing" of Africa from long distance trade nor an 
African participation on a basis of "mutual inequality" of 
exchange seems a reasonable choice. The alternative pattern 
of Latin America was also not objectively open in 1850 
because Latin America's institutional and dominant socio-cultural 
pattern was already European in origin in a way rather more 
akin to Africa of 1950. However, a continuation and intensi­
fication of mercantile pre-colonial neo-colonialism gradually 
driving deeper direct contact routes into the interior and 
carving out additional limited concession zones and infra-
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structure routes (as in Thailand or Haiti or - nearer to 
home - Liberia and Ethiopia) was a possible alternative 
and one which at least some metropolitan capitalist 
formations e.g. the bulk of those backing the British 
Liberal Party,, favoured not primarily for moral or 
isolationist reasons but out of their perceptions of 
economic self interest.
A  short list of formations gaining includes:
a.) bureaucrats and army officers - dominantly drawn 
from aristocratic or landlord capitalist sub-classes;
b.) direct African trade participants to the extent their 
share in colonial trade was higher than it would have 
been under neo-colonial, their costs were lower 
(e.g. companies could offload administration and 
policing costs on the colonial state or the metro­
politan taxpayer), or they traded with settler colonies 
wnrch clearly onerecl Broader opportuiixta.es than cirenL 
(non-settler) states would have done;
c.) inefficient export manufacturers who would have been 
frozen out under a "free trade" regime - not least by 
trading companies based in their countries but wishing 
to remain competitive (CFAO and SCOA did not stock 
similar proportions of French goods in Senegal and the 
Gold C o a s t );
d.) domestic manufacturers who secured supplies of raw 
materials at lower cost than they could have bought 
them under other patterns of penetration (i.e. users of 
metals and settler produce) or who could buy from 
domestic currency sources and pass on the higher costs 
under conditions of national external balance weakness 
and high protection.
Prior to 1945 it is difficult to argue that these gaine 
constituted the leading capitalist formations in the United 
Kingdom. Even in the ctvse of France it is doubtful that th 
could be so characterized although they were clearly more 
influential and more numerous and benefitted by their class
linkages with other domestic capitalist sectors and firms.
Portugal was a metropolis but hardly a central capitalist
economy so much as an intermediary (’’relay station"?) of
the United Kingdom. Only in Belgium can a clear case of
the main colonial gainers being more or less co-terminus
with the dominant metropolitan capitalist groups be made
12convincingly in respect of African colonies. However,
this is not to make state support for them inexplicable -
capitalist ruling coalitions are rarely monolithic and any
significant coalition member can win some backing for its
13interests from the state and, less certainly, directly
14from other coalition members.
To "sell" colonialism, the Africa (or Asia) lobbies
had to argue that the gains came totally from the colonies
and benefitted all or almost all members of the national
political decision taking coalitions at home or to fall back
on "gloire", "realpolitik” (e.g. naval bases to keep the seas
open for non-colonial trade), or "self" sufficiency in raw
materials. Their analysis should not be accepted at face
value - certainly major capitalist state leaders hardly
tainted with anti-imperialism e.g. Gladstone, Bismark, Lincol
and Clemenceau did not accept it as more than marginally and
15selectively valid.
At one level,this debate is somewhat irrelevant to the 
impact of colonial expansion on Africa. Even if prance 
(as "symbolized" by its GDP), French capitalists and even 
(taken as a group)French concessionary capitalists in the 
French Congo acquired negative net investible surpluses from 
the French"Congo over 1890-1930, the impact on the Congolese, 
the evolution of Congolese society and the heritage of the 
independent polity are not thereby altered. Colonialism 
could be (in the case cited probably was) a negative sum 
game both for metropolitan capitalism and subject peoples.
At a different level there is some relevance. To the extent 
that colonial integration not only yielded an enhanced surplu
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to the periphery oriented capitalist units and formations 
but also covered the governmental infrastructure costs of 
colonial operations and allowed net lower costs to other 
capitalists (and/or some labour strata) than a continued 
mercantilist neo-colonialism would have done, it necessarily 
involved extraction of more surplus from Arica. While a 
part of this could - and did e.g. in Egypt and settler 
colonies - flow from reducing the absolute standard of living 
of Africans (i.e. driving socially necessary subsistence 
toward, or below in certain cases, physically necessary) 
much of it must have come from increasing relative exploitation 
involving expansion of the level of productive forces. Since 
the chief posthumous claim to "respect" of colonialism is 
precisely that it did raise per capita productive force levels 
and thus lay a foundation on which African societies and 
polities could build/evidence of "loss making" colonies is 
more a criticism of colonization as an effective capitalist 
instrument than praise of it as an "humanitarian enterprise".
It is difficult to strike a balance for three reasons. 
First, how continued neo-colonialism would have evolved Is a 
matter of conjecture. Clearly it could not have provided 
structures adequate to the Rand, Katanga or the settler 
colonies. Whether it could have been molded and adapted to 
build-albeit more slowly-the groundnut economy of Senegal, 
the cocoa economy of the Gold Coast, or the cotton-c.offee 
economy of Uganda is less clear. A flat negative answer 
is not self evident. Second, the distribution by metropot 
would have been different. The UK, USA and German shares 
would have been larger, the French smaller, the Italian and 
Belgian negligible and the Portuguese vanishing. Third, the 
balance of gains and losses is hard to estimate because of 
the exploitative nature of colonial trade pricing (which 
probably was more exploitative than would have been possible 
under the imperialism of neo-colonial free trade) and the 
paucity of detailed national accounts on a class and formation 
basis. However, some tentative comments are possible.
British Southern Africa paid handsomely for the UK 
capitalist system as a whole once the conquest was completed. 
Taken together,the rest of British colonial Africa yielded 
surpluses to the "colonial interests" and settlers, covered 
its own administration and infrastructure debt service costs 
(thus providing some transfers to the administrative bourgoisie 
sent out to administer), and provided moderate surplus gains 
on markets and supply sources for British industrial 
capitalist units not directly involved in the colonial trade.
Algeria,and to a lesser extent Tunisia and Morocco, 
benefitted the overall French economy and capitalist groups 
beyond those directly involved. The sub-Saharan French 
colonies as a group almost certainly imposed a net cost on 
the overall French economy (excluding price gains at least 
logically achievable by neo-colonial trade) and especially 
on the French state. The colonial budgets were heavily 
subsidized to the benefit of the bureaucratic and military 
services and of the more inefficient French manufactured 
goods exporters.
The Belgian Congo was not merely a source of surplus 
to Belgium but probably a critical one,especially after the 
adventurist Leopoldian*' colony of open pillage1 phase ended.
The linkages between colonial surpluses and metropolitan 
expanded reproduction were closer than in any other case 
partly because of the very highly cartelized and intertwined 
nature of Belgian capitalism.
P o r t u g a l ’s colonies did not over the period in question 
give large net surplus flows to the Portuguese metropolitan 
economy nor stimulate an industrial capitalist sector of 
real significance in Portugal. This was partly because 
Portugal lacked the resources to exploit them (or indeed 
govern them to the same degree as France, Britain or Belgium) 
and relied on foreign firms, concessionary-corvee adventurism 
and near peasant level colonization to an exceptional d s g r e e . 
After 1945 the balance - at least in terms of foreign currency 
earning - may have changed and at all times the pricing 
policy on trade with Portugal was of an exceptionally surplus
draining type for Mozambique and Angola.
The German colonies did not on balance benefit the 
German Empire economically despite a methodical and ruthless 
growth policy but - excluding N a m i b i a  - that probably is a 
feature of their early *loss as much as of the rather marginal 
and geopolitical role, in which Imperial G e r m a n y ’s ruling 
coalition saw them. Certainly German efforts at raising 
production in Togo, Cameroon and Tanganyika exceeded 
subsequent British and French in both resources devoted 
and medium term results.
The Italian colonial empire - to the extent it was not 
a self delusion - was overtly seen in geopolitical terms and 
especially as a starring point to more extensive and lucrative 
colonies (on both counts including the reversal of the verdict 
of Adawa) .
The overall African record is thus not very impressive 
for colonialism as a tool of capitalist growth and purposive systemic 
whence especially if the two main settler colonies (Algeria 
and South Africa) are excluded. Liberia on the face of it had 
about as much (or as little) growth as Dahomey. Ethiopia 
admittedly modernized (in any sense) later and expanded its 
productive forces more slowly than most colonies. It had a 
very limited capitalist presence and a dominantly tributary 
system which did not set major emphasis on accumulation.
However, it is not clear than colonial rule would in fact 
have produced greater change than the 1930-1970 imperial 
efforts (albeit perhaps over 1900-1940) - Ethiopia had very 
major natural barriers to either export oriented or "naturally" 
integrated raising of productive force levels. Certainly the 
dependent growth of Egypt under Mohammed Ali was more rapid 
than for most of the Bri tish period and even probably more 
lucrative for European c a p italists.
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A capsule summary of the economic impact on different P
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formations is subject to a rather inadequate exhibition of 
the specificity of situations. Certainly the general impact 
was most damaging in settler colonies and least so (probably 
positive in nQrrowly economistic, short run terms) in the 
colonial trade enclaves with the highest ieveis of productive 
forces e.g. the Gold Coast after 1890, Buganda after- say - 
1910, the Gezira from the late 1930's albeit the caveat 
must be entered that Gold Coast c o c o a ^  and Buganda cotton 
and coffee could probably have been produced to almost the 
same e x t e n t fif at somewhat later dates,under a neo-colonial 
p a t t e r n .
Broad formation economic impact seems to have been:
a . ) traditional aristocracies were reduced in economic 
status by the conquest^ sometimes partially restored 
(or even created) under indirect rule (e.g. in both the 
British and French West African Savannah colonial areas 
and in parts of U g a n d a ) , and fatally weakened, both by 
conquest and use as compradores, in respect to the post- 
colonial neo-colonial phase;
b . ) bureaucrats with "modern" education did achieve a higher 
economic status relatively and absolutely than in the 
actual pre-colonial neo-colonial states but both a 
quite low absolute one until after 1945 and probably
a lower one than they would have occupied in an evolving 
neo-colonial/dependent pattern as illustrated by their 
significant share in renewed neo-colonial gain sharing;
c.) modern productive sector roles were largely limited to 
a handful parallel to the bureaucracy and (except in 
settler colonies) a small proportion of the labour force 
in unskilled, low wage employment almost certainly not 
appreciably above pre-colonial domestic agricultural or 
artisanal incomes. In the case pf settler colonies they 
were dominantly "land clearance scheme" or tax "induced" 
on the supply side and even more disadvantageously placed 
economically;
d. ) medium scale African businessmen - who were significant
at least in many parts of West Africa until near the end 
of the 19th century - were systematically squeezed into
bankruptcy or back into petty trading (a partial reversal 
did not occur until the post-1945 late colonial period);
Small scale African businessmen were tolerated so long 
as they either filled the bottom rungs of hierarchies in 
which European firms and petit blancs - or more often non- 
European compradore immigrants - could not operate 
with adequate returns or filled interstices in the 
dominant system's structure. Even so the increased 
penetration of imports and, to a lesser degree and later, 
of locally produced manufacturers tended to erode the 
economic status of traders and a forti'arl craft 
producers to a significantly greater extent than would 
have characterized a continued neo-colonial pattern; 
peasants who were advantageously placed to produce 
"export crops" often achieved absolute gains (but ones 
related to dependent trade not colonial rule per s e ) 
but only the proto-kulahs among them were able to 
generate adequate surpluses to sustain growth in (or 
even hold constant) these gains. Food farmers were 
usually weakened especially if they lived in non-export 
crop zones and forced to par levies . Settler colony peasants 
suffered most evidently from near total loss of desirable 
land (to Europeans) land and partial enforced proletarianism, 
a case perhaps most totally and starkly exemplified in 
N a m i b i a ,  Botswana and the Bortustan in the south and 
the Mahgrebin tell in the north.
modern politicians are a class which did not become 
prominent until after the relevant period (with partial 
exceptions in Liberia, Egypt and,on a very limited scale, 
Senegal). They were to become the main intermediary 
(and beneficiary) class in the subsequent neo-colonial 
phase but until 1945 were still inchoate within the 
public service and modern educated elements of the modern 
productive, small business and traditional aristocratic 
f ormations.
It may be asked how within this frame of reference 
one can explain rising African populations from 1900 
onward. The answer can hardly be health services nor 
improved standards of living for the vast majority of 
Africans. Rather it lies in the fact that the end of 
the slave trade, the dislocations caused by earlier 
penetration and reactions to it, the halting of intra- 
African state wars of conquest, the completion of the 
colonial conquest, and the phasing out of the brutal, 
uneconomic (for the metropolis and its capitalists as 
well as Africa) concessionary adventurist phase did lead 
to a pattern of relative law and order which reduced 
deaths by violence and by famine following dislocation. 
Further the break-up of African social patterns (whether 
by urbanization, migration, or evisceration in s i t u ) seems 
to have led to higher birth rates because African societies’ 
elements of birth spacing and family spacing disintegrated 
with the destruction of the social order of which they were 
p a r t .
IV
The colonial variant of the peripheral capitalist mode 
of production has not been homogenous in Africa. At least six 
sub-variants can be identified. However, it is not, on the 
whole, analytically useful to use these to '’classify’' regions or 
even in many cases whole territories and, indeed, sub-variants
could and did coexist in the same territory albeit usually with 
18one dominant. L
a. subordinated African producer based trade (Amin's colonial 
trade economy) utilised penetrative "equal", unequal (in
Amin's sense)^ and oligopolistic trade to extract local produce
at prices allowing the merchant to achieve a. surplus and to 
inject relatively over-priced (in world market terms) manufactures 
In its commonest form the African producers were a mix of small 
peasants and proto kulaks but larger non-capitalist (e.g. the 
Islamic brotherhoods in Senegal, parts of Ethiopia), proto- 
capitalist (e.g. the Sudan plantation ancestors to the present 
private pump schemes), state capitalist (e.g. Mohammed Ali's
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concessionary company allocation whether to chartered companies 
during the transition to colonialism or to purely commercial 
adventurers within a titular colonial framework wase a 
transitional phase. The chartered companies usually found 
the costs of administration too high to be offset by even 
a trade monopoly, the adventurers - with the notorious exception 
of King Leopold of the Congo - on balance failed to extract 
much surplus and - most assuredly including Leopold - operated 
a system of pillage which was quite incompatible with stable, 
sustained exploitation;
foreign plantation based production tended to be dominant as a
replacement of concessions and of mercantilist slave colonial 
structure-s pre-dating 1800 (e.g. the Cape Verdi Islands,
Fernando ?o, Reunion, Mauritius) but was common for specific 
crops (e.g. sisal and sugar and at one period bananas and 
tobacco) and as a favoured (but usually non-competitive) parallel 
to subordinated African producers (e.g. in AOF, Nigeria,
Uganda) in countries in which it was either secondary or ec-eq.a. ' 
with other production patterns;
foreign non-agricultural enclave production was dominant in minir 
and in secondary industry (local market or export processing).
The former did dominate some territorial economies, the latter - 
while not uniformly negligible by 19^5 even outside the settler 
economies - was very much secondary and concentrated in a few 
cities;
e. European settler based production on a broad front was dominant 
only at the Northern.iand Southern ends of the continent (includin 
Zimbabwe) but pockets of settler agriculture were scattered 
throughout British East and Central Africa and the larger 
Portuguese colonial territories (where it became dominant 
supplanting plantations and a primitive cross between sub­
ordinated African production and state ran concessions after 
1945);
f. labour reserve areas appeared to remain "traditional” 
"subsistence" economies to the casual (and in many cases the 
not so casual) observer. In fact whether they had been created 
by settler expropriation (e.g. Lesotho, the non-settler rural 
areas of Algeria, the Kikuyu reserves) or by the destruction of 
earlier economic relations with areas more intensively directly 
exploited under colonial rule (e.g. Upper Volta, Mali, large 
areas of Southern Tanganyika;they were very far from being 
unaffected or irrelevant to the colonial system of production. 
Their impoverishment - augmented where necessary by taxation - 
made them labour supply depots and their remaining agricultural 
potential allowed their migrant workers to be paid at less than 
family physical subsistence wages because the family, perforce, 
remained in the reserve. While usually described in relation 
to labour supply depots for settler, enclave or foreign 
plantation agriculture the labour reserves have also been critica 
to some subordinated African producer based economies (e.g. 
Voltaic labour in the Gold Coast and - admittedly after 19^ -5 - 
far more centrally in the Ivory Coast). To a minor extent the
t Mahgrebin labour reserve areas were serving European labour 
market unskilled labour requirements by 19^5 but their major 
role in the "exporting" "guest workers" began significantly laser 
as did the significant (albeit numerically and as a percentage 
of territorial labour force lower) flows from some AGE regions 
(e.g. the Middle Senegal basin).
To apply this analytical frame to one country is not always easy, 
to apply it regionally or continentally leads to a danger of a less 
of portability and of salient parallels and divergences. Coastal
•
' West Africa through the Cameroon was dominantly a series of 
subordinated African producer territorial units with secondary 
foreign non-agricultural enclaves and diminishing foreign 
plantation elements. French conquered West African savannah 
(through.'1 Chad territories and parts of the Gold Coast and Nigerian 
Savannah cones were basically labour reserves. Ciabon and the 
Middle Congo (now CAR) were dominantly foreign forestry enclave 
plus plantation economies while in the French Congo limited 
foreign plantation, logging and non-agricultural enclave urits 
were perhaps about co-equal. The Western Belgian was dominated 
by foreign plantation and the Eastern by mining enclave production 
with internal labour reserve areas surrounding them and two 
relatively large industrial enclaves at Leopoldville and in Katanga. 
Angola and Mozambique had a shifting balance of plantations, 
settlers, labour reserves (for export to South Africa as well as 
domestic use) and subordinated African producers. In South Africa 
the settler dominance-linked to African labour reserves - was so 
great that it would perhaps be inappropriate to treat the plantations, 
mines and non-agricultural sector separately except for the fact 
that they were largely owned by external and settler groups who had 
distinct secondary contradictions with the Afrikaaner dominant 
settler group. Southern Rhodesia was a smaller and somewhat diluted 
South Africa. Northern Rhodesia was dominantly a raining enclave 
economy with a significant settler sector and labour reserves while 
Nyasaland was perhaps balanced between labour reserve and plantation 
roles. Madagascar and Uganda were basically African subordinated 
producer in their territorial economic pattern as were the Sudan 
and Ethiopia (albeit the pattern of subordination was more complex 
in the last case). Rwanda and Eurundi combined subordinated 
African production with a labour reserve (for both the Congo and 
East Africa) role. Kenya was co-dominated by a settler enclave in 
the "white highlands", a plantation enclave on the coast and 
industrial enclaves in Mombasa and Nairobi plus labour reserve 
areas to serve them, and to a lesser degree Tanganyika and Uganda. 
Tanganyika had a large plantation and small settler enclaves balanced 
by subordinated African production and a peripheral labour reserve 
role in respect to Southern Africa despite being a heavy net labour 
imp crier. Egypt probably had a dominantly subordinated If: ' . 1
producer based territorial economy in 19^5 albeit,if one lumps the 
Suez Canal with the other external non-agricultural enclaves,that 
sector was more important from the Metropolitan optic. Algeria
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" was a settler colony with labour reserves in which separating 
settler-plantation-non-agriculturai foreign elements probably 
would be pointless for 19^5 (though not after the rise of the 
oil sector). Morocco and Tunisia while settler and enclave 
dominated had much more significant subordinated African producer 
components than Algeria. The older ex-slave plantation colonies 
(Cape Verdi, Fernando Po, Sao Thome and Principe, Reunion and 
Mauritius) became foreign plantation dominated and the former 
Arab slave plantation based states (Comoros, Zanzibar) subordinated 
African producer centred economies with an Arab intermediary layer 
over the share cropping (de jure or de facto) tenants. Spanish 
Sahara, Eritrea, Libya, British and Italian Somaliland, mainland 
Equatorial Guinea and Portuguese Guinea were economically almost 
non-existent from a capitalist point of view - subordinated African 
production, foreign plantations (with the exception of the 
Italian Somaliland banana enclave) and settler implantation were 
all unsuccessful. French Somaliland was - economically - a foreign 
enclave in the Ethiopian territorial economy.
The impact of these elements on the growth of productive forcc- 
the structure of production and the distribution of output was 
critical. The most disastrous role from all points of view was 
that of labour reserve since in that case net transfers had to be 
earned by temporary outmigration with serious territorial economic 
well as social, corrosive effects. Intensive settler colonisaticn 
had the most positive effect on territorial average levels of 
productive forces and on the balance of production (as the territcr 
accounts of South Africa and Algeria demonstrate). Its economic 
impact on Africans - at least so long as the territory remained a 
colony - was, however<destructive. Plantations where dominant term: 
to raise the average levels of productive forces but not to improve 
the structure of production nor African incomes. Mon-agricultural 
enclaves were rarely dominant but did tend to raise average output 
per capita, create a small above average income African "proletaria 
and in the domestic market oriented cases (but net mineral or feres 
extraction nor export processing) create a slightly less imbalanced 
structure of production and use. During the colonial period 
subordinated African production gave the highest incomes to African 
(and probably also the greatest broadly based inequalities among 
them) but in most cases relatively low average levels of productive 
forces and radically imbalanced structures of production and use.
VThe economic roles of penetration were not basically altered 
by the transition to colonialism .nor during the colonial period.
They remained:
a. to secure at costs allowing a surplus to the acquiring
commercial house (whether a producer or not) on their export
and sale in a capitalist metropot or another colony;
b. to provide opportunities for commercial units to sell imports 
at prices which yielded a surplus;
c. to open outlets at surplus yielding prices for metropolitan
producers;
d. to make available opportunities for profitable investment
of capital in production for metropolitan or colonial markets;
e. to provide a vent for settlers and temporary migrants from
the metropolis.
The first of these was dominant in respect of Africa as a whole 
and for metropolitan capitalist powers as a group. It did not alway
mean "cheap" produce in terms of world market prices. If the
metropolitan decision takers placed (for whatever reason) a premium 
on own currency sources and de facto or de jure protected their 
suppliers (not if they were African their producers) then the 
products might well be quite "dear" e.g. Somaliland bananas, AEF 
cotton in the interwar period, German East African rubber. Even 
the United Kingdom in the late Second World War and 19^5-50 period 
provided support for, and indeed massive state investment in,, 
production seen as "cheap" in foreign exchange shadow pricing 
terms not those of the world market. A related variant involved 
subsidies to sellers to buy from colonies and sell to earn other 
metropolitan currencies.
For most major trading units,the second goal was linked to 
the first. A balanced trading operation required a two way flow 
of sales and purchases. For this purpose the sources of the goods 
was irrelevant. However, metropolitan producer micro and macro 
concerns were fairly central to the metropolitan coalitions 
perceptions of colonial gains throughout the period except in the 
case of the United King.:':::, up to the mid 1920s. Froi then throt ’ 
19*15 the UK did practice imperial protection with Japan the chief 
competitor to be kept out.
♦ By and large investment opportunities \ a mil
* colonialism in Africa - the most significant : rofitafcle directly 
productive investment was in mining and in that case the production 
was critical to securing the export product. Plantations were seen 
in similar terms as a fortiori was infrastructural investment which 
was, indeed, usually both metropolitan state financed and not 
directly surplus generating. Secondary industry colonial market 
oriented investment (in the colony or the metropolis) was quite 
minor both relative to the metropolis and to the total "colonial 
interest" group with the partial exceptions of Algeria and: South 
Africa.
Vent for settlers and temporary migrants (administrators,<»
merchants, managers) was perhaps central to Italian colonial economic 
strategy but was a secondary element in the case of other metropolises.
The evolution of penetration over 1800-19^5 falls into three 
periods: 1800-1850 was characterised by the decline of the mercantile 
neo-colonialism of the slave trade and its partial replacement by - 
that of legitimate commerce; 1850-191^ was marked by the establishment 
and initial organisation of the colonial system; 19^-15^5 saw a 
slackening of general momentum because the global capitalist 
system and especially its periphery were almost continuously 
jnvolved in crises.
Over 191^-1918 the First World War partly isolated the colonies 
from the metropolises and involved campaigns against the German 
colonies which used a considerable portion of what attention and 
resources were available in Subsaharan Africa while drafts of men 
(especially in the French case) and resources (e.g. on Egypt for 
the British Middle Eastern campaign) affected Mediterranean Africa
3. S W 611 .
1918-1930 was.marked at the broad periphery level first by the 
short lived commodity boom and then by a longer period of commodity 
price depression and the strengthening (as e.g. at the Ottawa 
Conference in the British case) of the drive for partially closed 
trading systems to strengthen metropolitan external balance positions. 
In Africa the boom led to a burst of public investment - e.g.
Governor Guggisb erg' S Seven Year Plan in the Gold Coast,‘the . . 
completion of the basic East African railway network, the’ buildup 
of Dakar and the Dakar-Bamako link in AOF. Most o.. this ^p.ctftujl'ly.** 
came after the boom had passed and colonial territorial - revefrues 
0 once again shaky. The increased operating and debt' service'
costs of this wave of investment contributed to the wave of 
late 1920s and 1930s retrenchments which pulled colonial governments 
back to a much more limited law and order role than had characterised 
their consolidation and initial developmental phases. It was not 
any general objection to interventionism nor devotion to Smith's 
invisible hand which held colonial governments back - neo-mercantilist 
intervention by policy and precept was, on the whole, enhanced and 
multiplied so long as it cost little to promulgate and administer.
The constraint was finance.
The commodity slump on the periphery (and the special British 
crisis related to its over-valued currency) were exacerbated in 
Africa as well as in the metropolises over most of the 1930s by 
generalised industrial economy unemployment. Metropolitan budgets 
were strained3 metropolitan investors were in retreat, metropolitan 
firms hardly needed rapidly rising imports. Indeed the intensification 
of the "cutthroat competition" - "price ring" cycle in Anglophonic 
West Africa bears witness to the colonial firms' group need to 
enhance the surplus on a given volume of business by lowering 
costs and raising the import/export price ratio in the colonies and, 
at the same time, their contradictory individual drive to increase 
surplus through expanding volume via competitive bidding away of 
each other's business.
Under these circumstances the periphery's least central 
region was certainly not the object of any general development 
drive. Three classes of exceptions can be identified:
a) the gold sector boomed - costs fell and the terms of exchange 
for gold against currency rose - with special territorial 
significance for South Afri*ca;
b) protectionism against foreign currency sources to protect
the franc led to major attempts to raise commodity production 
in francophone Africa but to do so without putting in new 
investment or public services - an approach which had distinct 
limits (e.g. the opening up of the Ivory Coast or Guineavas 
not possible under it because major infrastructure could not 
be financed) and special characteristics (e.g. a greater • 
emphasis on subordinated African production to lessen calls on 
colonial state and metropolitan money market resources). A 
settler variant of this "strategy" operated in the Mahgreb with 
somewhat more real resources devoted to its implementation;
c) import substitution in Algeria, South Africa and the Belgian
Congo to preserve local consumption capacity in the face of 
disappointing export earnings. This variant of the Latin 
American first round defensive import substitution was limited - 
at least on any significant -scale - to a few territories 
because colonial structure was, by definition, not one in 
which colonial state initiatives for closing markets against 
the metropolis were likely to be begun much less allowed to 
go very far. South Africa, however, was de facto an independent 
state. The Belgian capitalist group was able to find investment 
opportunities in the Congo by substituting against non-Belgian 
imports thus melding metrpolitan macro-monopolist micro- and 
colonial territorial macro interests into a less self evidently 
contradictory temporary working synthesis than was possible 
in other sub-Saharan colonies. Algeria was seen as a French 
province and thus in terms of regional policy.
The partial metropolitan economy and global commodity market 
recoveries of the late 1930s probably would have led to more activist 
colonial development of productive forces policies backed by more 
infrastructural investment and a more substantial capitalist firm 
concern in trade and selected production enhancement with and in 
African colonies in the early 19^0s had they not been followed so 
closely by the Second World War - e.g. British Colonial Development 
Planning thinking and legislation shows an upsurging from 1938 
onward. The direct impact of fighting in Africa was extreme in the 
North and Northeast but the resource calls (especially in terms of 
both African and colonial administrator/manager manpower) were much 
more widely spread.
The economic impact was,outside battle zones, on balance 
stagnationist (or worse) but highly unequal. Import starvation 
was uniform because of shipping constraints. Exports were affected 
in the same way unless they were raw materials critical to military 
production, e. g. the Belgian Congo's copper, cobalt ar.d uranium,in 
which case they boomed. Mercantilist intervention by the colonial 
states did seek to raise local market oriented production in both 
food and light manufactures. While more widely spread than the 
1930s manufacturing sector growth that of the war years was relativel; 
limited in coverage and depth both because market size was limited 
and because adequate equipment and intermediate goods imports' were 
not available.
At the end of the Second World War the majority of African
colonies probably had lower real per capita levels of productive 
forces than in 191^* Colonialism centred on crisis wracked 
metropolitan capitalism had not proven a dynamic means to development 
of production. The major exceptions were Algeria (seen as a 
province of France), the Belgian Congo ("benefiting" from the 
rather special metropolitan production and corporate structure) 
and South Africa (with a state independent enough to follow its 
own neo-mercantilist Keynesian political economic strategy along 
lines more similar to the larger Latin American states than to 
those of colonial territory administrations). African colonies 
and Africans had indeed been exploited and because of lack of 
resources to carry out exploitation in any other way subjected 
to a high degree of overt repression. But more than either they 
had been disregarded - increasingly treated as the periphery of 
the periphery; a reserve army perhapstbut not of labour power that 
it was in the metropolis ' interest to exploit nor to its danger to 
allow to become increasingly pauperised.
VI
In 19^5 it was not clear that the colonial era in Africa 
was moving to its close. Africans would have been almost as 
startled as Europeans at an assertion that by 1965 only the Portugues 
and Spanish colonies and the Southern redoubt would remain or that 
by 1975 the former would be in the last stages of dissolution and 
South Africa seeking to buy a temporary detente by jettisoning 
Rhodesia and Namibia. Indeed the late 19^0s and early 1950s were 
marked by the most energetic attempts at colonial territorial develop 
ment since the initial conquest; efforts which were not then seen as 
laying the base for a new neo-colonial relationship but for a long 
continuation of colonial rule.
In retrospect the circumstances and elements which led to
a metropolitan transformation of capitalist relationships with Africa
21to a new neo-colonialismc gradually evolving into mere complex
22forms of dependence can be seen more clearly:
a) the Second World War had -.in complex ways - shaken both 
metropolitan self confidence and will and African belief in 
the invincibility of Europeans;
b) the early dissolution of the Asian empire reinforced beliefs
and doubts tending toward running down colonialism in Africa;
c) the changed balance among the metropolitan capitalist economies
n Q c. u
strengthened the USA which had a continuing ex-colony’s 
general objection to colonialism and a "free trader's" 
self interest in the substitution of less tightly focused 
patterns of dependence.
d) the enhanced power of the socialist industrial economies 
both (in 19^5-1955) required concentration of effort on 
"stabilising" the European political economic and territorial 
balance (thus putting a higher opportunity cost on large 
scale colonial repression) and influenced African aspirations 
and concepts of the attainable in ways which made direct 
colonialism harder to sustain without rising repression;
e) the success of the colonial system in creating a pattern of 
infrastructure and institutions adequate to sustain a new 
neo-colonialism meant that - if the training of Africans
to operate them;already begun on cost saving grounds, could 
be stepped up - the economic ends of colonialism could 
apparently be furthered without continued direct rule;
f) the failure of the colonial system to yield high and growing 
surpluses over 191^-19^5 on the one hand provided a case 
for re-equipping it in physical and personnel terms to meet 
anticipated expanded metropolitan import and export needs 
and, at the same time, for cost and risk cutting especially 
on the overhead side. The former strand was not necessarily 
inconsistent with guided neo-colonial states and the latter 
positively favoured them over colonies;
g) both the successes and failures of colonial rule had created 
African formations intensely frustrated in social, economic 
and political terms, increasingly unwilling to accept the myth 
of European omniscience and omnipotence, and - critically - 
in the case of many elite and some producer groups perceiving 
independence in terms of taking over the colonial state and
» production strategy so that Africans could run it for them­
selves and at a brisker pace but not in a radically different mann 
There were African formations who had a very different view of 
what independence should mean but far more metropolitan energy 
was put into seeing that they did not become the inheritors, 
or that they were socialised into the patterns and objectives 
of the colonial territorial political economic model by 
"transitional rule" participation, than in root and branch 
resistance to independence of non-settler colonies. "Who" 
and "When" came to be seen as crucial to maintaining: the
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benefits of metropolitan - peripheral relations with Africa 
'and "whether" in respect of formal independence an increasingly 
dead issue;
h) the increasing oligopolisation of international economic
transactions (including in respect to African territories where
it had always been at a higher level than for intra­
metropolitan transactions) and the growing importance of soft 
technology (e.g. marketing, purchasing, financing, organising) 
and hard technology (e.g. machines, processes and the ability 
to operate, maintain, reproduce and adapt or develop them) 
steadily reduced the actual and the perceived danger of political 
independence leading to effective economic nationalism of the earlj 
19th century USA or turn of the century Japanese varieties.
(In Latin America this was to mean a metropolitan reconquest 
of the control lost during 1930s first wave economic nationalist 
import substitution, in Africa and Asia a generally easy shift 
from colonial to post colonial economic supremacy patterns.)
This schema is deceptively simple in four senses. First, it
arbitrarily abstracts from non-political economic and non geo-political
factors which were of significance in Africa and in Europe. Second, 
it is retrospective in the extreme, nobody analysed in these' terms 
and with this degree of articulated foresight in 1 9^5 - 5 5 although 
variants of most of these considerations can be identified in 
policy statements and actions of that period. Third, because of the 
lack of any clear decolonisation model the process was - at least at 
the secondary level - both particular to territories in Africa and 
to metropolitan powers and marked by false starts and dead ends
e.g. the French drive for integration (impossibly expensive if carried 
to its Cartesian logical end and self contradictory if stopped part 
way) and the Belgian for colonial maintenance by tecnnico-economic 
bolstering and intellectual isolation of the peoples of the Belgian 
Congo. Finally, wherever large numbers of settlers or a belief 
(as in the Portuguese case and a fortiori the South African) that 
empire and nationhood were intertwined were at stake,the transition 
from colonialism to deper.dence began later, was characterised by 
much higher levels cf violence and, therefore, in a majority of 
cases (not all,e.g. Kenya) to result in a successor state more 
altered from its colonial predecessor than in the "easy transition" 
cases.
The basic themes remain. Colonialism in Africa was on the
verge , of retreat in 19^5 not because the metropolitan powers did 
not possess the power (in absolute'terms) to maintain it (vide 
Madagascar in the late 19^0s) nor because economic dominance had 
become less desirable. As the burst of late colonial, transitional 
and early neo-colonial capitalist state and private investment in 
Africa bear witness, the latter was the reverse of the truth.
African production and trade were#and were seen to be;about to 
become of more importance to the central economies than at any point 
in the previous thirty years. Rather, the potential now existed/and 
was increasingly perceived to exist/ to substitute dependence for 
direct colonial rule at a net political economic gain to a majority 
of the central capitalist economies and their dominant decision 
taking groups and a significant number of African leaders and 
formations saw such a shift as quite consistent with their own 
interests. The foundations for the 19^5-1965 transition to neo­
colonialism as the dominant political economic relationship 
between Africa and the world capitalist system had been laid.
NOTES
The territorial dimension of this paper therefore diverges 
from Samir Amin's of "Underdevelopment and Dependence in 
Black Africa - Origins and Contemporary Forms" Journal of 
Modern African S t u d i e s , Vol 10, no. 4, although not from 
his overall body of work which does analyze Mediterranean 
Africa at the case study level. Territorial frames of 
reference are not exclusive: the Mediterranean Region or 
the Arab World are also potentially useful and partially 
overlap each other as well as Africa. Similarly 
Mediterranean Africa, West Africa, East Africa as well as 
Black Africa can be useful territorial frames at a more 
limited but still cross territorial level. The case for 
using Africa, continentally bounded, in this context is 
that over 1800 - 1945 its penetration by the metropolitan 
capitalist powers had enough basic elements in common to 
make it a useful reference frame.
"Stages" in this sense are analytical or methodological 
tools not temporal sequences, inevitable points of arrival 
cF empirical categories. Marx's stages are of this type; 
Rostow's and - in a different way - Kuznets' are not.
The Congo Basin Treaties' "free trade" provisions are not 
an adequate total explanation. France circumvented them 
from the beginning in AEF and the UK avoided (or secured 
exemptions from) them whenever this was relevant to its 
East or Central African economic integration objectives.
On and from are not identical in this context. A  study 
centered on Tanzania's international economic relations 
could be from a metropolitan economy pers p e c t i v e . One 
from a Tanzanian perspective would place central emphasis 
on the meaning of the relations for and to Tanzania and 
(groups or classes of ) Tanzanians whether or not it was 
informed by an explicit or implicit global m o d e l .
Japan is not of significant relevance to the economic 
penetration of Africa over 1800 - 1945. Its attempt to 
break into the African market in the 1930s was blocked by 
hastily erected tariff modifications. Except for Liberia 
the USA was also only marginally involved after the 
decline of the slave trade.
An interesting discussion of some of these issues appears 
in Kate Neale "Marxism and African History", AFRAS Reviev/, 
no. 1, Summer 1975.
7. E.g. the Oil Rivers states or - much later - Mohammed All's 
Egypt and its Sudanese colony.
8. The ramshackle nature of the European presence is perhaps 
most vividly portrayed in European novels (e.g. Conrad, 
Cary) and its terrifying face in African fiction.
9. In the case of Latin America the interests of the USA 
and the UK coincided. Keeping the Western hemisphere 
open to UK trade required making clear that the British 
fleet would block reconquest and thus de facto providing 
the military shield for the Monro: D octrine's geopolitical, 
Caribbean trade and contiguous territorial expansionist 
oriented rejection of a revived Spanish/or any alternative 
new European/colonial dominance. Therefore, 1800 - 3945 
Latin American integration into the world capitalist 
economy was through the mechanisms of dependent penetration 
not colonial rule.
10. For example, the British misread the Fanti-Ashanti state 
conflict. Logically they should have backed Ashanti, 
established coastal forts with Ashanti authorization and 
dealt with Ashanti nominated intermediaries and pr o ­
consuls over the Fanti not backed Fanti resistance to 
establishment of Ashanti's hegemony.
11. This is not intended as a normative justification. It
is a critical element in understanding Lusitanian imperial 
policy. Of course a political economic element does 
enter because Portugese state decision takers obviously 
stood to lose by the reincorporation of Portugal into a 
single, centralized Iberian kingdom.
12. In Asia the congruence of colonial oriented and dominant
metropolitan interests was greater especially in the
Indian subcontinent and the East Indies. However, the 
main trade and investment thrusts of capitalist global 
economic integration in its Eurocentric phase were 
focused on the periphery's areas of European settlement - 
the Americas and Australasia and to a much lesser degree 
Algeria and South Africa.
13. State support could be changed to taxpayers who were, in 
part, not members of the capitalist coalition.
14. So too, at times, could intra-coalition support e.g. 
selling Latin American infrastructure bonds to middle 
class savers in Britain.
15. Jules Ferry was driven from office for twenty years when
a minor skirmish (literally) in Tonkin went wrong,
General Gordon was not effectively supported or extricated 
nor very promptly "avenged". The imperialist coalition 
has a narrow care base, an unstable body of loose 
associates and anything but consistent, firm control over 
the commanding heights of metropolitan state policy.
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16. Cocoa in the Gold Coast owed almost nothing to the 
colonial state. Relevant agricultural advice and support 
was negligible, rail transport was secondary to cocoa 
(even if critical for gold mining), the critical
market provision function was played by coastal based 
merchant firms using up country African and Lebanese 
intermediaries.
17. "Modern" African neo-tribalism and titles are by no 
means simple descendants of pre-colonial peoples, social 
groups and aristocrats. The new political class has 
often skillfully manipulated the geographic-cultural 
solidarity elements of the "traditional" system to 
create a new clientilist base but there is far from a 
direct correlation between this type of political 
strategy and traditional aristocratic background, much 
less world-view. The Kabaka of Buganda and the 
Kigahda aristocracy failed to establish national 
hegemony in Uganda precisely because they sought to 
recreate pre-colonial "national tribalism" and failed to 
manipulate "neo-tribal localism" with the skill of
Dr. O b o t e .
18. This analytical frame draws on the divisions made by 
Amin (op. cit.,) but is far from identical. Regional 
classification appears unsound even in the Amin matrix 
and concessionary company colonialism was a brief phase, 
which certainly influenced but did not totally dominate 
the subsequent evolution of colonial penetration in the 
territories in which it was applied.
19. Unequal in this sense relates to terms of exchange more 
unequal than the productivity of the underlying labour 
fhrce and not flowing solely from particular oligopoly 
or ologopsony positions. It is basically similar to 
one variant of the Prebisch-Singer deteriorating terms 
of trade for primary products case.
20. To that extent Amin ( o p . c i t . , )  appears to oversimplify. 
Concerns as to stability of supply, "self" sufficiency 
as a geo-political strength and external account balance 
were at times dominant and seen as justifying colonial 
trade in political economic terms even when lower cost 
sources of supplyjn the simpler sense clearly existed.
For the colonial trading firm "cheap" related to costs 
versus selling price attainable irrespective of whether 
the latter were artificially high (or low).
21. Neo-colonialism is used here to relate to the form of 
dependence in which the role of domestic intermediaries 
is very limited especially in the fields of technical 
personnel, organization of production and management of 
medium and large scale enterprises. It is likely to be 
a phase in dependence not a stable pattern for any 
extended period because the metropolitan presence is too 
overt and the base and mass of the intermediaries too 
narrow. Either more mediated (but by no means
fnecessarily looser or weaker) -forms of dependence or 
a reaction against dependence (e.g. the Arusha 
Declaration and its implementation in Tanzania, the 1972- 
74 political events in the Malagasy Republic) are likely 
to ensue. In this sense it is not accidental that the 
main body of analysis of dependence in Africa as 
n&o-colonialism does date to the 19G0s and early 1970s 
with more recent work tending increasingly either to 
speak of dependence or to treat neo-colonialism 
explicitly as one phase of the development of dependence.
22. The more "advanced" forms of dependence typically include 
a sharply reduced visibility of the expatriate presence; 
a much more substantial African business and professional 
group and an expanded African public sector critically 
linked to, and sharing at least some political economic 
interests with, the dominant foreign economic interests; 
some diversification of external economic relations 
among industrial economies and a lesser unilateral 
concentration on the former metropolis. Wnere these 
conditions are not readily met, neo-colonial 
retrenchment may lead to increased stagnation and 
instability (e.g. probably Dahomey, Niger). Where they 
are readily fulfilled a regional intermediary role
vis a vis smaller or "mere recalcitrant" dependent 
territories may be promoted by central capitalist 
interests as well as local political coalition members 
(e.g. K e n y a ) .
23. A clear example - albeit well after 1945 - is France's 
trading a large proportion of the cost of providing 
infrastructure for dependent growth in Africa against a 
portion of its preferred position in francophone African 
markets in the original EEC Association arrangements.
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